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STILL IN EXILE? THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE
CONTRACT CLAUSE
JAMES W. ELY, JR.*
The Contract Clause is no longer the subject of much judicial solici-
tude or academic interest.' Since the 1930s the once potent Contract
Clause has been largely relegated to the outer reaches of constitu-
tional law.2 This, of course, was not always the case. On the contrary,
throughout the nineteenth century the Contract Clause was one of the
most litigated provisions of the Constitution. In 1896, Justice George
Shiras astutely commented: "No provision of the constitution of the
United States has received more frequent consideration by this court
than that which provides that no state shall pass any law impairing
the obligation of contracts."' A brief survey of the evolution of con-
tract clause jurisprudence helps to put into perspective the current
desuetude of the Clause.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The first provision protective of contractual rights was contained
in the Northwest Ordinance of July 1787.4 Its adoption anticipated
* Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law, Emeritus, and Professor of History, Emeritus,
Vanderbilt University. This Article is an expanded version of remarks presented at the
Fifteenth Annual Brigham-Kanner Property Rights Conference at the College of William &
Mary on October 5, 2018. I want to thank Katie Hanschke of the Massey Law Library of
Vanderbilt University for her valuable research assistance. I also wish to thank David F.
Forte for his helpful comments on an earlier version of this Article.
1. Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution provides, in part: "No State . .. shall pass any...
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
2. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 237 (2016)
("By the 1940s the political triumph of the New Deal and the accompanying growth of the
regulatory state relegated the contract clause to the periphery of constitutional law.").
3. Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118, 121 (1896).
4. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North-West
of the River Ohio, art. 2 (July 13, 1787) in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
1774-1789, 340 ("And, in the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood and
declared, that no law ought ever to be made or have force in the said territory, that shall, in
any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts, or engagements, bona fide,
and without fraud previously formed."); see Denis P. Duffey, The Northwest Ordinance as a
Constitutional Document, 95 COLUM. L.REV. 929,960 (1995); Matthew J. Festa, Property and
Republicanism in the Northwest Ordinance, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 409, 448-52 (2013).
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the move at the Constitutional Convention to fashion a constitu-
tional guarantee of agreements from state abridgements. Although
the Contract Clause was added to the Constitution late in the delib-
erations of the Convention and without much debate, prominent mem-
bers of that body stressed the importance of a prohibition on state
interference with contracts as a means of protecting contractual
stability and promoting commerce.' The measure was undoubtedly
a response to the unhappy experiences with state debt-relief laws
passed during the post-Revolutionary Era.' It bears emphasis that
the framers thought a specific ban on state abridgement of agreements
was so essential as to warrant adoption in the Constitution at the
same time they were arguing that a bill of rights was unnecessary.'
There were harbingers of robust contract clause jurisprudence even
before the advent of John Marshall as Chief Justice in 1801.*
At the same time, there were limitations on the reach of the pro-
vision. By its express language, the Contract Clause applied only to
the states and not to Congress. Thus, Congress was free to abridge
contracts should circumstances dictate and was expressly authorized
to enact bankruptcy laws.? Moreover, as James Wilson pointed out
at the Constitutional Convention,"0 the Clause only safeguarded ante-
cedent agreements against retroactive legislation and did not limit
state laws pertaining to subsequent agreements made after the
5. ELY, supra note 2, at 12-17.
6. ALLAN NEVINS, THE AMERICAN STATES DURING AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION, 1775-1789
404-05, 537, 571 (1924); Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property
Rights on the Legal System of the Early American Republic, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 1135, 1137-40;
James W. Ely, Jr., Economic Liberties and the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 45 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 673, 698-700 [hereinafter Ely, Economic Liberties].
7. Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 537
(1989) ('This was the Federalist effort to link the eighteenth century's affirmation of indi-
vidual liberty with the rhetoric of contract and private property. Thus, the Federalists valued
market'freedom' so highly that they forbade the states from'impairing the obligation of Con-
tract' in the original 1787 Constitution, at a time when they believed an elaborate Bill of
Rights unnecessary.").
8. ELY, supra note 2, at 22-29.
9. Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902) (Fuller, C.J.) ("The subject
of 'bankruptcies' includes the power to discharge the debtor from his contracts and legal lia-
bilities, as well as to distribute his property. The grant to Congress involves the power to
impair the obligation of contracts, and this the states were forbidden to do.").
10. Remarks in the Federal Convention (August 28, 1787), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 158 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007) ("Mr. Wilson. The answer
to these objections is that retrospective interferences only are to be prohibited.").
94 [Vol. 8:093
2019] THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE CONTRACT CLAUSE
effective date of the law." The Clause had no prospective application
to future contracts.
The Contract Clause influenced the drafting of subsequent state
constitutions. Most states, as they revised existing or adopted new con-
stitutions, incorporated language to safeguard the security of agree-
ments. This development strengthened the high standing of contracts
in the constitutional order.12 State courts regularly enforced the con-
tract clauses in both federal and state constitutions throughout the
nineteenth century."
Both John Marshall and his successor Roger B. Taney developed
the Contract Clause into a muscular restraint on state authority.
Marshall notably construed the provision to cover public as well as
private contracts.14 In a line of famous cases he ruled that the Contract
Clause reached state land grants,15 grants of tax exemption," and
corporate charters." Marshall also applied the provision to protect pri-
vate contracts in the face of state debt-relief laws.'" Taney moder-
ated the protection afforded corporations under the Contract Clause
by strict construction of the privileges contained in corporate char-
ters," but for the most part he built upon Marshall's jurisprudence.
For example, the Court under Taney's leadership repeatedly upheld
grants of tax exemption against state-legislative attempts to levy
taxes.2 0 In addition, Taney vigorously wielded the Contract Clause
to vindicate private contracts and sustain the contractual rights of
11. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 262 (1827); see also id. at 327 (Trimble,
J.) (commenting that the Contract Clause left the states "full liberty to legislate upon the
subjectof all future contracts"); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595,603 (1877) ("The States may
legislate as to contracts thereafter made, as they may see fit. It is only those in existence
when the hostile law is passed that are protected from its effect.").
12. Ely, Economic Liberties, supra note 6, at 702.
13. E.g., Jones v. Crittenden, 4 N.C. 55 (1814); People ex rel. Thorne v. Hayes, 4 Cal. 127
(1854), overruled in part by Hooker v. Burr, 70 P. 778 (Cal. 1902); Oatman v, Bond, 15 Wis. 20
(1862); The Homestead Cases, 63 Va. 266 (1872); Swinburne v. Mills, 50 P.489 (Wash. 1897).
14. ELY, supra note 2, at 32-43.
15. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
16. New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812).
17. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
18. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
19. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)
420 (1837); see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, 112 (1991)
("The real effect of the Charles River Bridge case was to give entrepreneurs what they bar-
gained for.").
20. ELY, supra note 2, at 81-86.
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creditors. He explained that the Clause "was undoubtedly adopted
as a part of the Constitution for a great and useful purpose. It was to
maintain the integrity of contracts, and to secure their faithful exe-
cution throughout this Union, by placing them under the protection
of the Constitution of the United States."21
The Civil War and Reconstruction generated a number of novel
contract clause claims as well as a number of issues similar to those
addressed in the antebellum years.2 2 The Supreme Court upheld the
validity of contracts, calling for payments in Confederate currency
and contracts for the purchase of slave property. It invalidated the
retroactive application of enlarged homestead exemptions that were
enacted in postbellum Southern states as impairments of anteced-
ent agreements.2 3 In the same vein, the Court sustained legislative
tax-exemption grants as within the shelter of the Contract Clause.24
It looked skeptically on a variety of legislative schemes to repudiate
municipal debt.2 5
Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 indirectly impacted
the role of the Contract Clause in the late nineteenth century.26 The
Contract Clause had been the primary vehicle for federal judicial re-
view of state legislation until this point. That would gradually change.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment opened the
door for an additional avenue of federal court review and in time
would partially eclipse the Contract Clause.27
In the late nineteenth century, courts and commentators lavished
praise on the pivotal role of contracts in the market economy and
the vital role of the Contract Clause. Justice William Strong insisted
21. Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311, 318 (1843).
22. James W. Ely, Jr., The Contract Clause During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 41
J. Sup. Cr. HIST. 257 (2016).
23. James W. Ely, Jr., Homestead Exemptions in Southern Legal Culture, in SIGNPOSTS:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SOuTHERN LEGAL HISTORY 289-314 (Sally E. Hadden & Patricia Hagler
Minter eds., 2013).
24. See, e.g., Wilmington R.R. v. Reid, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 264 (1872); Wash. Univ. v. Rouse,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 439 (1869); Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 430 (1869).
25. See, e.g., Bd. of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1871); Von Hoffman v. City of
Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1867).
26. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part, that no state shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
27. ELY, supra note 2, at 155-57 (pointing out that in the late nineteenth century
railroads increasingly relied on the Due Process Clause rather than the Contract Clause in
challenges to state-imposed rate regulations).
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in 1878: "There is no more important provision in the Federal Consti-
tution than the one which prohibits States from passing laws im-
pairing the obligation of contracts, and it is one of the highest duties
of this court to take care the prohibition shall neither be evaded nor
frittered away."28 State courts often expressed similar sentiments. The
Supreme Court of Alabama, for instance, declared in 1881 that the
purpose of the contract clauses in federal and state constitutions "was
to preserve sacred the principle of the inviolability of contracts against
that legislative interference which the history of governments has
shown to be so imminent, in view of the frequent engendering of popu-
lar prejudice, and the consequent fluctuations of popular opinion."
2 9
To be sure, courts continued to vindicate private contracts; for ex-
ample, striking down statutes that substantially impaired the rights
of mortgagees in mortgage contracts.' At the same time, however,
the Contract Clause began to gradually fade in significance. This was
apparent in litigation involving public contracts. Although paying
lip service to Dartmouth College,31 the Supreme Court adhered to the
strict construction principle and moved away from the notion of in-
violate corporate charters.32 Moreover, the Court gradually embraced
the concept of an alienable police power to safeguard public health,
safety, and morals. Accordingly, a state could not relinquish such
power by entering a contract.3 3 State regulatory authority increas-
ingly prevailed notwithstanding language in public contracts or corpo-
rate charters. As the Contract Clause waned in significance, those',
challenging state legislation came more and more to argue that the
challenged law constituted a deprivation of liberty or property, with-
out due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Contract Clause continued to decline in the early decades of the
twentieth century.34 The number of such cases before the Supreme
28. Murray v. City of Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 448 (1878).
29. Edwards v. Williamson, 70 Ala. 145, 151 (1881).
30. E.g., Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S. 118, 129-32 (1896); Savings Bank of San Diego v.
Barrett, 126 Cal. 413 (Cal. 1899).
31. Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
32. ELY, supra note 2, at 152-55; HOVENKAMP, supra note 19, at 33 (observing that in the
late nineteenth century "the notion that a corporate charter was a contract according vested
privileges to the corporation substantially fell apart").
33. See, e.g., Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878); Stone v. Mississippi, 101
U.S. 814 (1880); New York & New England R.R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556 (1894).
34. ELY, supra note 2, at 192-93.
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Court dwindled. Even the protection afforded private agreements
began to erode. In 1905, the Supreme Court determined that private
as well as public contracts were subordinated to the alienable police
power. In other words, police power was paramount to any rights es-
tablished in agreements between private parties.35 It now appeared
that state lawmakers could abridge private arrangements whenever
they deemed it necessary. This point was underscored by litigation
emanating out of unprecedented rent-control laws enacted in several
cities following World War I. The laws were predicated upon the al-
leged existence of a public emergency in housing conditions.36 Land-
lords maintained that the rent-control laws abridged existing leases
in violation of the Contract Clause. In a cursory opinion, Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes brushed aside this argument and upheld the New
York measure as a temporary response to address an emergency.3 7
Writing for four dissenters, Justice Joseph McKenna found a con-
tract clause violation. He asked, if states could invoke the police power
to override contracts, what other provisions of the Constitution might
similarly be subordinated to that power.8
The Great Depression of the 1930s and the political programs of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal had a profound impact
on constitutional aw. New Dealers called for expanded governmen-
tal intervention in the economy and sought to redistribute economic
power. This approach was in sharp contrast to the commitment to
limited government and the respect for private property that charac-
terized traditional constitutionalism.3 9 The Contract Clause was a
prominent casualty of this change in outlook.
The weakened state of the Contract Clause was vividly demon-
strated in the controversy over state laws imposing a moratorium on
mortgage foreclosures. As the system of mortgage financing largely
collapsed in the wake of the Depression, lawmakers in a number of
35. Manigualt v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) (Brown J.); see also David P. Currie,
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Protection of Economic Interests, 1889-1910, 52
U. CHI. L. REV. 324, 334-35 (1985) (declaring that Manigualt "was perilously close to saying
that states could impair contractual obligations whenever they had a good reason").
36. For the background of this controversy, see ROBERT M. FOGELSON, THE GREAT RENT
WARS: NEW YORK CITY, 1917-1929 (2013).
37. Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921).
38. Id. at 199-201.
39. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HIs-
TORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 125-41 (3d ed. 2008).
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states sought to protect homes and farms from foreclosure of delin-
quent mortgages. These laws harkened back to nineteenth-century
relief laws. Indeed, laws altering the terms of mortgages were rou-
tinely struck down during the nineteenth century as violations of
the Contract Clause. Nonetheless, a divided Supreme Court, in the
seminal and controversial case of Home Building and Loan Associa-
tion v. Blaisdell (1934), upheld a Minnesota moratorium law, reject-
ing a contract clause challenge.4 0 Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes stressed the existence of emergency conditions
and argued that the State's overriding protective power could justify
interference with agreements.4 1 In time, his broad language opened
the door to virtually reading the Contract Clause out of the Constitu-
tion. To be sure, Hughes attempted to cabin the reach of his opinion
by setting forth some limitations. Among other criteria, he pointed out
that the Minnesota law was temporary in operation and protected
the security interest of the mortgagee.42 In a forceful dissent, Justice
George Sutherland noted that the Contract Clause was adopted during
a period of economic distress and strenuously denied that an emer-
gency furnished a reason for avoiding the restrictions of that provi-
sion. He presciently warned that the majority opinion paved the way
for further encroachments on both private and public contracts.
4 3
To be sure, the Contract Clause did not disappear overnight. In the
late 1930s and early 1940s, the Supreme Court relied on the Clause
several times to invalidate state laws, suggesting that the scope of.-
Blaisdell might be confined.44 But it turned out, however, that
Blaisdell, in fact, delivered a near-fatal blow to the efficacy of the
Contract Clause. As the Roosevelt appointees gained control of the
Court, they treated Blaisdell as the governing authority and ignored
both the limitations expressed by Hughes and the subsequent deci-
sions that confined its application. The emphasis on emergency situa-
tions as a justification for contractual impairment, for example, was
40. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
41. Id. at 437-41.
42. Id. at 444-47.
43. Id. at 448.
44. E.g., Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362 (1941); Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S.
189 (1936); W.B. Worthen v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935); W.B. Worthen v. Thomas, 292
U.S. 426 (1934); see David F. Forte, Forgotten Cases: Worthen v. Thomas, 66 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
705, 711-16 (2018) [hereinafter Forte, Forgotten Cases] (arguing that in these cases the
Supreme Court sought to narrow the emergency exception articulated in Blaisdell).
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specifically rejected.45 Instead, the New Deal Court stressed the legisla-
ture's wide discretion to set economic policy and override contracts
via the police power without regard to emergency conditions. It repeat-
edly demonstrated a dismissive attitude toward the Contract Clause.
In effect, the Court adopted a balancing test, heavily weighted in favor
of state authority, in assessing violations of the provision. Largely
ignored and serving no meaningful purpose, the Contract Clause was
not invoked again by the Supreme Court for more than thirty years.
Despite this period of neglect at the federal level, the Contract Clause
retained some modest efficacy at the state level, where courts some-
times relied on contract clauses in state constitutions.
II. THE CONTRACT CLAUSE'S DOUBTFUL REVIVAL
In the late 1970s, the Supreme Court expressed a fleeting interest
in the provision46 but in so doing promulgated a convoluted multi-
factor test that did more to obfuscate than to clarify contract clause
jurisprudence.4 7 In practice, the analytical framework established
by the Supreme Court did more to uphold state regulatory authority
than protect the rights of contracting parties from state interference.
As an aside, this multipart formula is reminiscent of the equally fuzzy
balancing test articulated in Penn Central to determine the existence
of a regulatory taking of property.49
45. Veix v. Sixth Ward Building and Loan Association, 310 U.S. 32, 38-40 (1940).
46. See, e.g., U. S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (invalidating repeal of covenant
in bond agreement); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978) (striking
down law retroactively imposing change in company's pension plan).
47. The current test asks three questions: (1) Has a change in state law operated as a
substantial impairment of a contract? (2) If the impairment is substantial, does the law serve
a legitimate public purpose, such as remedying a broad social or economic problem? (3) Are
the means chosen to accomplish this purpose reasonable and appropriate to the public
purpose? Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-13 (1983).
For a discussion of the standard of review, see ELY, supra note 2, at 241-48.
48. Forte, Forgotten Cases, supra note 44, at 722 (cogently concluding that "all that re-
mains of the Contract Clause's protective sweep is an asymmetric middle-tier test that has
little analytic benefit and virtually no legal effect").
49. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1987); see Steven J.
Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 601,604
(2014) (finding Penn Central test to be incoherent); Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and
Sausages:A Quarter-Century Retrospective on Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City ofNew
York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 679 (2005); see also Steven J. Eagle, Land Use Regulation
and Good Intentions, 33 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 87, 138 (2017) ("In practice, the Penn
Central ad hoc, multifactor balancing test has not proved auspicious for property owners.").
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To compound the muddle, the Supreme Court imposed a higher
standard of review when a state abridges its own contracts. It main-
tained that "complete deference" to a legislative determination of
reasonableness and necessity was inappropriate when the state's
self-interest was involved.' This dual standard is problematic on
several grounds. There is no textual or historical basis to differenti-
ate between the scrutiny given to private and public contracts."
Moreover, the Court has never made clear what level of scrutiny is
appropriate for public contracts, and lower courts have wrestled with
this without guidance. Cases dealing with public-employee contracts
often raise the issue of the standard of review.
To be sure, some state courts have shown a willingness to more
vigorously enforce the constitutional ban on legislative impairment
of existing agreements.5 But the fact remains that the Supreme
Court has not invoked the Contract Clause to invalidate a state law
in over forty years. Little wonder, then, that in 1995 Judge Douglas
Ginsburg pictured the provision-along with other neglected parts
of the Constitution-as part of the "Constitution-in-exile," provisions
"banished for standing in opposition to unlimited government."
53
III. THE CONTEMPORARY MUDDLE
The Supreme Court's most recent foray into contract clause juris-
prudence, Sveen v. Melin, decided in June of 2018, did little to alter
this bleak scene.' At issue in Sveen was a Minnesota statute that
50. U.S. Tr. Co. of New York, 431 U.S. at 22-23.
51. ELY, supra note 2, at 242; see also Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and
Property Rights: A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Con-
stitutional Structure, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 267, 293-94 (1988) ("[T]he modern thrust of contracts
clause jurisprudence is precisely backwards.... [I]t is interference with private contracts that
lies at the heart of the clause."); Thomas W. Merrill, Public Contracts, Private Contracts, and
the Transformation of the Constitutional Order, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597, 609 (1987)
("[Tihe modern Court has in effect turned the contract clause of both the 
framers and the
post -CharlesRiverBridge era on its head. The prior understanding was that private contracts
were protected from state interference with more rigor than public contracts.").
52. Brian A. Schar, Note, Contract Clause Law Under State Constitutions: A Model for
Heightened Scrutiny, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 123 (1997).
53. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 1995 REG. 79, 80 (1995) (reviewing
DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE
THROUGH DELEGATION (1993)).




automatically revoked the designation of a former spouse in a life
insurance policy upon the dissolution of a marriage." The law was
enacted after Sveen purchased a life insurance policy and named his
wife, at the time, as beneficiary. Following their subsequent divorce,
Sveen took no action to alter his beneficiary designation. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the retroactive application of the
law to Sveen's policy violated the Contract Clause.' Admittedly, this
was not a topic likely to arouse deep public interest.
The Supreme Court disagreed and rejected the contract clause
claim. The Court majority, in an opinion by Justice Elena Kagan, ap-
plied the prevailing multipart test. Although conceding that "the law
ma[de] a significant change," she nonetheless concluded that the
revocation statute did not "substantially impair" the pre-existing
contract." One could ponder whether there is a meaningful or merely
a semantic distinction between such wording. In any event, Kagan
offered several arguments to buttress her conclusion that the law
did not substantially impair the insurance contract. She reasoned
that the statute was designed to reflect the presumed intention of
the policyholder not to benefit a former spouse. Perhaps even more
telling, Kagan also emphasized that the policyholder could easily
avoid application of the law by redesignating the former spouse as
beneficiary." In short, the Court majority pictured the Minnesota
statute as simply a default rule that did not place an onerous bur-
den on the policyholder." By deciding the Sveen case on narrow
grounds, the majority had no occasion to consider the broader argu-
ment that the multipart test was inconsistent with the original under-
standing of the Contract Clause as well as its historical construction
by the courts, and therefore should be jettisoned.
55. State courts were divided as to whether retroactive application of revocation-upon-
divorce statutes ran afoul of the Contract Clause. Compare Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Schilling,
616 N.E.2d 893 (Ohio 1993), and Parsonese v. Midland Nat'l Ins. Co., 706 A.2d 814 (Pa. 1998),
with In re Estate of DeWitt, 54 P.3d 849 (Colo. 2002), and Mearns v. Scharbach, 12 P.3d 1048
(Wash. Ct. App. 2000).
56. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Melin, 853 F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 2017).
57. Id. at 1822.
58. Id. at 1823-24.
59. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit Court ofAppeals awarded the
proceeds of the insurance policy to the Sveen children. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Melin, 899
F.3d 953, 953 (8th Cir. 2018). Thereafter the Supreme Court of Alabama followed the ana-
lytical framework of Sveen and dismissed a contract clause attack on a revocation-on-divorce
statute. Blalock v. Sutphin, 2018 WL 5306884 (Ala. Oct. 26, 2018).
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Dissenting alone, Justice Neil Gorsuch maintained that the retro-
active application of the statute to an insurance policy purchased
before its enactment ran afoul of the Contract Clause.' More impor-
tantly, he was receptive to a far-reaching re-examination of current
contract clause jurisprudence. He pointed out that historically the
Supreme Court had interpreted the provision to bar any legislative
interference with contracts.6 ' Further, Gorsuch declared that the cur-
rent multifactor test "seems hard to square with the Constitution's
original public meaning."6 2 Echoing Justice Hugo Black," Gorsuch
expressed concern that the Court had reduced the protection af-
forded agreements by the Contract Clause to an uncertain balancing
test. "Should we worry," he asked, "that a balancing test risks invest-
ing judges with discretion to choose which contracts to enforce-a
discretion that might be exercised with an eye to the identity (and
popularity) of the parties or contracts at hand?"
Even applying the current test, however, Gorsuch found a contract
clause violation. He insisted that the choice of a beneficiary was at
the heart of a life insurance contract and that a law undoing this
designation was a substantial impairment. Gorsuch added that this
impairment was not reasonable because the state could have achieved
its goal by more moderate and less intrusive means.65
Perhaps the Gorsuch-dissenting opinion will spark a fundamental
reconsideration of the Contract Clause by the Supreme Court. But
such an attitudinal sea change does not seem imminent. It is more
likely that the Justices will adhere to the pattern of generally ignor-
ing the provision and employing tests that make successful contract
clause claims very difficult. Even before Sveen, commentators pro-
claimed that the Contract Clause was virtually dead.
66
60. Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1826 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1827-28.
62. Id.
63. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 533 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) ("[Cion-
stitutional adjudication under the balancing method becomes simply a matter of this Court's
deciding for itself which result in a particular case seems in the circumstances the more
acceptable governmental policy and then stating the facts in such a way that the considera-
tions in the balance lead to the result.").
64. Sveen, 138 S. Ct. at 1827 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1828-29.
66. See, e.g., Richard Funston, Requiescat in Pace: A Memorial to the Contract Clause, 3
TEX. S. U. L. REV. 12, 24 (1973) ("Swallowed up by due process, the contract clause is no longer
1032019]
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Yet a eulogy for the Contract Clause, however diminished, seems
premature. The provision continues to figure in a surprisingly large
amount of litigation. Although the lower federal courts, following the
lead of the Supreme Court, have demonstrated little interest in enforc-
ing the Contract Clause, there are infrequent decisions which rely
on the provision to strike down state laws. Recently, for example, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated changes to an Indiana
teacher-tenure law with respect to layoffs as applied to already-
tenured teachers." Private contracts have also received occasional
protection. Some federal courts have looked skeptically at laws alter-
ing the rights of parties under existing franchise agreements.' In
2017, for example, the district court in North Dakota found that an
overhaul of the state-farm-equipment-dealership statute substantially
impaired a pre-existing contract and amounted to a special-interest
law that did not serve a legitimate public purpose.69
It is important to remember that much of this contract clause
litigation has taken place at the state level. This has given state courts
the opportunity to consider the degree of protection afforded to con-
tracts under state constitutions.70 Virtually all states have their own
contract clauses, modeled after the federal provision. A threshold
question is whether state contract clauses are equivalent to the
federal provision or whether they confer enhanced protection. The
answer is not easy and generalization is difficult. State court opin-
ions do not always clarify whether they are relying on the Federal
Constitution, the state constitution, or both. At least twenty states
have taken the position that their state contract clause is inter-
changeable with the federal language and have expressly adopted
the multipart federal test.7 1 In contrast, a number of state courts
a source of litigation."); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLuM. L.REV. 873,890 (1987)
(commenting that "the clause is now for the most part a dead letter"); see ELY, supra note 2,
at 238.
67. Elliott v. Bd. of Sch. Trustees of Madison Consolidated Schs., 876 F.3d 926 (7th Cir.
2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2624 (2018).
68. See, e.g., Equip. Mfrs. Inst. v. Janklow, 300 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 2002).
69. Ass'n of Equip. Mfrs. v. Burgum, No. 1:17-cv-151, 2017 WL 8791104 (D.N.D. Dec. 14,
2017), stay-pending appeal denied, 2018 WL 1773145 (D.N.D. Mar. 5, 2018).
70. For a classic argument calling for increased reliance on state constitutional law, see
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and theProtectionofIndividual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489 (1977).
71. ELY, supra note 2, at 251; see, e.g., CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 154
Idaho 379, 299 P.3d 186 (2013) (rejecting argument that Idaho contract clause provides
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have indicated that their state constitutions should be read to pro-
vide a more robust safeguard for agreements. Courts in Arizona,
Florida, Indiana, Texas, and Virginia, for example, have articulated
such a position.7 2 These differing approaches, of course, speak to the
larger issue of determining the extent state courts should construe
state-rights guarantees more broadly than federal doctrines."
Although the majority of contract clause challenges in recent
years have been rejected, state courts have invoked the provision to
strike down legislation in a variety of situations. In 2016, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina ruled that a state law retroactively revoking
the tenured status of public school teachers violated the Federal Con-
tract Clause.7 4 It found that the elimination of tenure in favor of
terms-of-years contracts was a substantial impairment of contrac-
tual benefits pertaining to job security. The state justified the repeal
as a means of eliminating underperforming teachers. The court, how-
ever, concluded that this was not a reasonable means of achieving
a legitimate public purpose, in view of less drastic alternatives. Con-
sistent with the principle that the Contract Clause does not have
prospective application, the court confined its ruling to the repeal of
tenured status earned prior to the effective date of the statute and
did not bar application of the repeal law to probationary teachers."
In sync with U.S. Trust,7 6 state courts have looked skeptically at
state efforts to evade their financial obligations. At issue in Maze v.
Board of Directors for Commonwealth Postsecondary Education
greater protection of agreements than the United State Constitution and adopting three-step
federal framework); Mearns v. Scharbach, 103 Wash. App. 498, 512, 12 P.3d 1048, 1055
(Wash. Ct. App. 2000), petition for rev. den. 143 Wash.2d 1101, 21 P.3d 291 (Apr. 10, 2001)
("The two clauses are substantially similar and are given the same effect.").
72. ELY, supra note 2, at 252-53; see, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Forbes/Cohen Florida
Props., 223 So. 3d 292, 299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017) ("The Florida Constitution offers greater
protection for the rights derived from the Contract Clause than the United States
Constitution."); see also Maze v. Bd. of Dirs. for Commonwealth Postsecondary Educ. Prepaid
Tuition Tr. Fund, 559 S.W.3d 354, 369 (Ky. 2018) (declaring that "Kentucky jurisprudence
takes a more restrictive view on the legislature's power to impose changes to existing con-
tractual benefits and obligations than the pronouncements of the federal courts," but applying
three-part federal test derived from U.S. Trust).
73. See Clint Bolick, State Constitutions: Freedom's Frontier, 2016-2017 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 15, 21-23 (2017) (noting that state constitutional law may provide enhanced protection
for private-property rights and economic liberty, among other individual rights).
74. North Carolina Ass'n of Educators v. State, 786 S.E.2d 255 (N.C. 2016).
75. Id. For an analysis of this case, see Tommy Tobin, Far from a 'Dead Letter": The Contract
Clause and North Carolina Association of Educators v. State, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1681 (2018).
76. U.S. Tr. Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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Prepaid Tuition Trust Fund, for example, were legislative changes
imposed retroactively on contracts made pursuant to the Kentucky
Affordable Prepaid Tuition Fund ("KAPT")." The program "allowed
families .. . to 'lock in' the current tuition rates for future attendance"
at Kentucky public universities.18 Financial miscalculations in ad-
ministering the program, coupled with significant tuition increases,
resulted in a "substantial unfunded liability."' In response, the legis-
lature adopted a series of amendments that placed time limitations
on KAPT contracts and curtailed the coverage for future tuition in-
creases.' The effect was to devalue the economic benefits promised
in the KAPT contracts. The State sought to justify its actions as dic-
tated by "economic necessity."a"
The Supreme Court of Kentucky struck down the retroactive appli-
cation of the amendments because they extinguished the contractual
rights of KAPT-contract purchasers to promised benefits. Invoking
a stricter standard because the State was a party to the agreement,
it found that the retroactive amendments amounted to an impair-
ment of contract in violation of both the United States and Kentucky
Constitutions. Concluding that the legislature could not demon-
strate a legitimate public purpose behind the law, the court stressed
that lawmakers could not "self-servingly renounce" debts.8 2
Other retroactive changes in prevailing law have also triggered
contract clause scrutiny. For example, a Florida District Court of Ap-
peals invalidated a municipal resolution that prevented a commercial-
mall tenant from subleasing part of its leased space without the
approval of both the mall owner and the city. It concluded that the
resolution diminished the value of the contract and failed to serve
a public purpose.' Moreover, the Supreme Court of Idaho struck
down a state law retroactively changing the formula governing the
distribution of workers compensation-fund ividends as a violation
of the state contract clause.'
77. Maze v. Bd. of Dirs. Commonwealth Postsecondary Educ. Prepaid Tuition Tr. Fund,
559 S.W.3d 354 (Ky. 2018).
78. Id. at 360.
79. Id. at 362.
80. Id. at 361-62.
81. Id. at 371.
82. Id. at 373.
83. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Forbes/Cohen Florida Props., 223 So. 3d 292, 300 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2017).
84. CDA Dairy Queen, Inc v. State Ins. Fund, 299 P.3d 186 (Idaho 2013).
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This brief survey of recent contract clause decisions in the lower
federal and state courts demonstrates that the Clause retains a
modest degree of vitality. But qualifications are in order. Few of
these cases present the kind of far-reaching contractual issues ad-
dressed by courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
None called into question the pervasive regulation of the economy.
Indeed, both federal and state courts seemed, on the whole, more con-
cerned with upholding state police power than vindicating contrac-
85tual arrangements.
The most frequently litigated contract clause claims today arise
from the ongoing financial crises experienced by many states and
localities.8" Most commentators agree that the large and growing
shortfall in funding for public-employee pensions and health bene-
fits is a primary source of financial distress. There are estimates that
in the aggregate such pension plans are underfunded by five trillion
dollars." Faced with such staggering deficits, many state and local*
governments have taken steps to trim benefits from both current
and retired public-sector employees.' These moves have triggered'
a torrent of litigation, alleging violations of the contract clauses in
both the state and federal constitutions. Given the malleable charac-
ter of the prevailing multifactor test, the uncertainty over the stan-
dard of review for alleged impairments of public contracts, and the
wording of different benefit schemes, it is hardly surprising that courts
have reached conflicting results. In these brief comments I cannot
assess the full range of these decisions.
As with any contract clause dispute, the initial inquiry is whether
the claimed employee benefits are contractual in nature. A number of
such claims in recent years have failed because courts have not found
an impairment of a contractual right to the particular benefit at issue.
In reaching this conclusion, courts have stressed that the principal
function of legislature is to establish policy, not make contracts.
8 9 It
85. ELY, supra note 2, at 258-60.
86. For the background of this controversy, see James W. Ely, Jr., Public Employees and
the Curious Mini-Revival of Contract Clause Jurisprudence, 2 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTs.
CONF. J. 37 (2013) [hereinafter Ely, Public Employees].
87. Sarah Krouse, State and Local Pension Woes Are Starting to Bite, WALL ST. J., July 31,
2018.
88. Id.
89. Dodge v. Bd. of Edue. of Chicago, 302 U.S. 74, 79 (1937) ('The presumption is that
such a law is not intended to create private contractual or vested rights, but merely declares
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follows that only when state lawmakers express an unequivocal in-
tent to create contractual rights in a statute would such a law amount
to a binding contractual commitment.0
In 2019, the Supreme Court of California applied these principles
in a case arising out of a California law revising public-employee
pensions and eliminating the opportunity for public employees to
purchase additional retirement service credits. Plaintiffs challenged
the law as a violation of the contract clause in the California Consti-
tution. Citing both federal and state authority, the court stressed
that the primary function of legislatures was to determine policy,
inherently subject to revision, and not to make contracts. It found no
basis on which to conclude that the legislature intended to establish
a contractual right to purchase any additional retirement credit. Since
there was no contract, the court had no occasion to consider whether
the elimination of the purchase option amounted to an unconstitu-
tional impairment of contract.1
When a contract governing employee benefits is involved, courts
have split as to whether state alteration of such agreements have
run afoul of the Contract Clause. One line of cases has sustained
a policy to be pursued until the Legislature shall ordain otherwise. He who asserts the creation
of a contract with the state in such a case has the burden of overcoming the presumption.")
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 466 (1985)
(declaring that the principal function of a legislature is not to make contracts but to enact
laws that establish policy, which are subject to revision).
90. See, e.g., Cranston Firefighters v. Raimondo, 880 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2018) (holding thatleg-
islative modification of state pension plans for government employees did not run afoul of con-
tract clause because state had made no binding commitment); Dodd v. City of Chattanooga,
846 F.3d 180, 186 (6th Cir. 2017) (stressing "the fundamental assumption in Contract Clause
analysis that legislation merely expresses current government policy-and future legislatures
are free to change that policy-rather than creating contractual obligations," and ruling that
municipal employee had no contractual right to default death benefit); Schwein v. Bd. of Ed.
of Riverview Cmty. Dist., 335 F. Supp. 3d 964 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (concluding that Michigan
Teacher Tenure Act did not grant teacher a contract and rejecting contract clause claim); Lake
v. State Health Plan for Teachers & State Emps., 825 S.E. 2d 645, 650-56 (N.C. Ct. App.
2019) (finding no contractual right to unalterable health insurance benefits); Terry v. State,
2017 WL 491930 at *5 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017) (noting "the existence of a presumption under
North Carolina law that no contractual rights are created by statute" and finding no con-
tractual right to future salary increases), review denied, 369 N.C. 751 (June 2017); State ex
rel. Horvath v. State Teachers Ret. Bd., 697 N.E.2d 644 (Ohio 1998) (employees had no
contractual rights to prospective benefits until benefits vested by the operation of law).
91. Cal Fire Local 2881 v. Cal. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 6 Cal. 5th 965, 435 P.3d 433 (2019).
The court differentiated between the opportunity to purchase additional retirement credit and
the implied contractual right for public employees to receive statutory pension benefits, be-
cause the later constitute a form of deferred compensation.
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legislative efforts to revamp employment contracts, granting deference
to legislative policy and stressing the severity of budgetary problems.
9 2
Yet other decisions have concluded that such actions violated the
Contract Clause, reasoning that the reduction of employee benefits
was neither reasonable nor necessary and determining that less
weight should be given to state and municipal financial crises. This
line of cases highlights an ironic twist: having lectured for decades
that courts should not second guess social and economic policies,
some courts now take the position that they have the duty to probe
the reasonableness of legislative policy regarding public-employee
contacts." This approach clearly entangles courts in policy matters
and raises the troublesome question of whether public-employee
contracts are being singled out for more favorable treatment than
is accorded other agreements.94 It recalls Justice Gorsuch's warning
that a pliable balancing test, in effect, confers on judges the discre-
tion to decide which agreements hould be enforced.
IV. IMPAIRMENT DISTINGUISHED FROM BREACH OF CONTRACT
Although states are held to a higher standard of scrutiny when
abridging their own contracts, not every dispute over the meaning
of a public contract gives rise to a contract clause violation. It has
long been held that cases involving the construction of state agree-
ments with individuals do not, standing alone, implicate the Contract
Clause even if the state denies liability under the contract.' Thus,
a breach of contract by the state, as distinguished from an impair-
ment, leaves the parties free to seek a remedy in the state courts.
92. ELY, supra note 2, at 262.
93. Id.
94. See Nila M. Merola, Judicial Review of State Legislation An Ironic Return to Lochnerian
Ideology When Public Sector Labor Contracts Are Impaired, 84 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1179, 1211
(2010) (asserting that "enormous public interest . .. demands that strict scrutiny be applied
to laws that impair public sector labor contracts" and insisting that "public employees deserve
the utmost protection").
95. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. City of St. Paul, 181 U.S. 142, 149, 151 (1901) (finding
there was no impairment of contract with the municipality, and stating that "it follows that
the record involves solely an interpretation of the contract, and therefore presents no con-
troversy within the jurisdiction of this court").
97. See Hays v. Port of Seattle, 251 U.S. 233, 237 (1920) (distinguishing between a law
violating a contract and one impairing its obligation, and asserting that if the contract at issue
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The absence of an effective remedy to enforce the contract, on the
other hand, might trigger contract clause review.
This rule found application in a 2018 decision by the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals." At issue was a Montana statute that altered
the price schedule for liquor sold to retailers by a state agency, pur-
suant to franchise agreements. The plaintiff liquor store had a ten-
year contract with the agency to purchase liquor at a fixed rate, and
was disadvantaged by the unilateral change. It brought suit alleging
both a breach of the contract and a contractual impairment in viola-
tion of the Contract Clause. Plaintiff contended that the state agency
had contractually promised not to alter the rates without the plain-
tiffs consent. In its defense, the State maintained that the agree-
ment expressly provided that the established rate was subject to
modification by state law and therefore the price adjustment was
consistent with the terms of the agreement. Thus, there was a dis-
pute over the interpretation of the agreement. The court insisted
that "an interpretative disagreement over a contract" did not run
afoul of the Contract Clause.' "At bottom," the court observed, "the
parties' arguments amount to dueling interpretations between the
parties over the proper meaning of their agreement."'oo It declared
that such a public-contract dispute did not impair the agreement so
long as the plaintiff could pursue a breach-of-contract claim against
the State for any injury suffered.01
Of particular interest, however, was the Ninth Circuit's emphatic
rejection of Montana's argument that a state could unilaterally
modify contractual terms as an exercise of its sovereign power. "An
assertion," the court maintained, "that the state always has the uni-
lateral authority to modify the provisions of a contract is inconsistent
was still in force "its obligation remained as before, and formed the measure of [the] right to
recover from the state for the damages sustained"); E & E Hauling, Inc. v. Forest Preserve
Dist. of DuPage Cty., 613 F.2d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 1980) ("The Supreme Court in the context
of the contract clause has drawn a distinction between a breach of contract and impairment
of the obligation of the contract. The distinction depends on the availability of a remedy in
damages in response to the state's (or its subdivision's) action. If the action of the state does
not preclude a damage remedy the contract has been breached and the non-breaching party can
be made whole. If this happens there has been no law impairing the obligation of the contract.").
98. LL Liquor, Inc. v. Montana, 912 F.3d 533 (9th Cir. 2018).
99. Id. at 537.
100. Id. at 539.
101. Id. at 538-39.
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with the requirements of the Contracts Clause .... 102 Although
recognizing that a state does not relinquish its sovereign power to
regulate by entering contracts, the court nonetheless tressed that
a state cannot avoid financial liability if a change in the law results
in financial harm to a contracting party.os It added: "Again, if state
law did allow Montana unilaterally to modify contracts between it-
self and others without providing a damages remedy, then the federal
Contracts Clause would be squarely implicated."
10 4
V. PROSPECTS FOR REVITALIZATION
So we are left with a diminished Contract Clause that, although
frequently ignored, is occasionally trotted out in unpredictable and
unprincipled ways to oversee state laws.
10 This is a curious result
for a provision that, as Lawrence M. Friedman has reminded us, was
framed to guarantee the stability of agreements.
0o
Yet the chances for a meaningful revival of the Contract Clause,
at least at the federal level, seem remote at the time of this writing.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has endorsed tests that
virtually eliminate the Clause from the Constitution. The road to
reform will not be easy. Nonetheless, I propose some steps that would
make the judicial reconstruction of the Contract Clause more consis-
tent with its text, history, and purpose.
Any move to restore the provision as a significant restraint on
states' interference with agreements hould start with the abandon-
ment of the murky multiprong formula. This test, with its near-supine
deference to legislative decisions regarding agreements, falls woe-
fully short of achieving vigorous enforcement of the Clause. The
Constitution does not provide that states may abridge contracts
whenever they can devise a reason.
102. Id. at 541.
103. Id. at 541-42.
104. Id. at 541 n.7.
105. See Douglas W. Kmiec & John 0. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the
Original Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 559 (1987) (observing that under the
current test "the Supreme Court has interpreted a constitutional provision that was designed
to provide certainty to contracting parties in a manner that maximizes the unpredictability
of its application").
106. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 203 (3d ed. 2005).
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The second step is to employ the same standard of review for both
private and public contracts. Consistent with the text and historical
understanding of the Clause, all agreements should be on a level
playing field.
The third move would be to look skeptically at economic distress as
an excuse for laws interfering with contracts-whether mortgages,
debts, bonds, or benefits promised to public employees. This was the
position that generally prevailed before Blaisdell."o' It follows that
the Blaisdell decision should be overruled as out of step with the con-
stitutional ban on contractual impairment.
These brief proposals hardly resolve all the interpretative issues
pertaining to the Contract Clause, but they would put us on a path
to restore the Clause as a vital part of the Constitution.'o
107. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cleveringa v. Klein, 249 N.W. 118, 124-28, 128 (N.D. 1933) (brush-
ing aside an argument that an economic emergency justified legislation enlarging the period
of redemption from mortgage foreclosure, and declaring that "[i]t must not be forgotten that
the right of private contracts is no small part of the liberty of the citizen").
108. For a more complete analysis of my proposals, see Ely, Public Employees, supra note
86, at 56-60.
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